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Abstract
By conceiving identity as endogenously defined and construing other central 
political concepts according to this assumption, constructivism has proven apt to 
understand and explain phenomena that eariler were hard to grasp. Constructivist 
ideas have here been used in order to analyze the events surrounding the Single 
European Act as a contrast to the more conventional rationalist approach used by 
Liberal Intergovernmentalism. As a result of this analysis, proposals for 
developments of the constructivist framework are put forward, the most important 
one being a specification of the conditions under which shaping or reshaping of 
identity occurs.
The empirical material is entirely made up of secondary sources such as books 
and articles. Since the focus of this paper is on the theoretical conflict between 
rationalist and constructivist analyses of European integration, the empirical 
aspect has an illustrative purpose rather than presenting further material. The 
theoretical part of the paper is, however, relevantly connected to the existing 
literature on constructivism.
The main findings are that constructivism can provide a plausible description 
of the SEA and hence is a serious contender to established theories of European 
integration, and, moreover, that constructivism seems able to explain changes in 
identity and actorness that rationalist explanations lack.
Key words: Constructivism, Liberal Intergovernmentalism, Single European Act, 
Identity, European integration
Table of Contents
1 Introduction....................................................................................................1
1.1 Aim and Disposition..................................................................................2
1.2 Methodology .............................................................................................3
1.3 Earlier Work on European Integration ......................................................3
2 Liberal Intergovernmentalism......................................................................4
2.1 The Liberal Intergovernmentalist View of the Single European Act........4
2.2 Some Problems with the Liberal Intergovernmentalist Description 
of the SEA............................................................................................................7
3 The Constructivist Approach .......................................................................9
3.1 Three ‘Logics’ of Action.........................................................................11
3.2 The Concepts of Identity, Actorness and Role-Taking ...........................12
4 A Constructivist Understanding of the Single European Act..................16
4.1 Characterizing the Events of the SEA.....................................................16
4.1.1 The Logics of Action.......................................................................17
4.1.2 Events Directly Related to the Negotiations ...................................18
4.1.3 Widening the Scope: Before the Negotiations ................................19
4.2 Norms ......................................................................................................20
4.2.1 The Norm of ‘New Measures’ ........................................................21
4.2.2 The Norm of ‘New Roles in the EC’...............................................21
4.3 Reconceptualizing Identity......................................................................22
5 Conclusions...................................................................................................25
References.............................................................................................................26
11 Introduction
Starting with Alexander Wendt’s ‘The Agent-Structure Problem in International 
Relations Theory,’ constructivism began to become a serious contender to the 
formerly prevailing rationalist theories of international relations theory.1
Rejecting the fundamental rationalist assumption of exogenously given identities,2
constructivism as a contrast had the potential to give explanations to events that 
formerly were considered highly problematic.3 As a result of this move, however, 
many other concepts were affected as well; along with a reconception of identity 
follow similar reconceptions of preference and agency. The rationalist way of 
addressing the agent-structure problem by emphasizing the primacy of agency 
thereby had met a more serious contender than the postmodernist approach of 
more or less reducing the problem to exclusively structuralist explanations and in 
that way only providing extremely abstract and counterintuitive descriptions of 
political events. Hence, constructivism has been described as occupying the 
ontological middle ground between rationalism and postmodernism.4 Arguments 
to the effect that this middle position is in fact contradictory have been presented, 
but no satisfactory consensus has so far been reached. Prima facie, it seems 
constructivism is a viable alternative to the two more extreme positions in the 
field. 
Related to constructivism’s consideration of ideational aspects and therefore 
its focus on discourse, there exists the problem of what the theory potentially can 
explain. In order for a theory to explain anything at all, it must be able to provide 
certain substantial claims. Andrew Moravcsik has criticized constructivism for not 
being able to do exactly that; he claims that it is a ‘characteristic unwillingness of 
constructivists to place their claims at any real risk of empirical 
disconformation.’5 Some plausible operationalizations have been presented, but it 
must be conceded that the constructivist interpretations of political or societal 
phenomena are better suited at understanding rather than explaining. Connected 
to this, constructivism seems less able to provide predictions about future events 
than do rationalist accounts; whereas rationalism clearly states identities and 
preferences from the outset, constructivism claims that these are developed during 
and through the events. This paper will partly be focusing on how this matter 
should be addressed. 
                                                                                                                                     
1 Wendt 1987. 
2 On rationalism’s assumption of exogenously defined identities, see e.g. Wendt 1995.
3 The demise of the Soviet empire is one obvious example: see Koslowski & Kratochwil 1994. 
4 Adler 1989.
5 Moravcsik 2001, p. 177.
2Another aspect of the constructivist framework that will be focused on is an 
understanding of how identities are formed. Constructivism is by its premisses not 
restricted to any certain understanding of which identities are interesting in 
political science, but is instead free to employ any account that is compatible with 
its basic ontological assumptions, namely that of a socially constructed reality as 
opposed to one given by nature. Due to constructivism’s claim that identities are 
determined endogenously, a constructivist account of analyzing political events is 
much less generalizable than rationalist accounts. In this paper, however, I will 
make an attempt at finding some recurring themes of constructivist explanations 
of European integration, with particular focus on how identities are shaped and 
reshaped in this context. In order to do this, I will use the events surrounding the 
Single European Act as an illustration of my development of the constructivist 
framework.
1.1 Aim and Disposition
The main purpose of this paper is to develop certain aspects of the constructivist 
framework that hitherto have been insufficiently examined. At the same time, 
however, this paper will provide an examination of the Single European Act 
conducted with analytical tools belonging to the philosophical idealist and 
constructivist traditions as a contrast to the more established rationalist 
understanding. The aim is therefore two-fold; it does at one blow develop and 
apply theory. In this process, the important guidelines are: (1) How can 
constructivism explain the outcome of the SEA? (2) In which ways is the 
constructivist understanding of the events preferable to a rationalist 
understanding? (3) How ought the constructivist ‘toolbox’ be developed, based on 
the events surrounding the SEA, in order to provide better explanations? This 
two-fold aim implies that the paper challenges the prevalent rationalist 
understanding of European integration in general and the SEA in particular, and at 
the same time examines how constructivism ought to be supplemented concerning 
the study of European integration. In response to Moravcsik, this paper will 
provide operationalizations of the constructivist approach aimed both for the SEA 
and the study of European integration.
The disposition of the paper is as follows. In chapter 2 the major points of the 
prevailing rationalist description of the SEA, here represented by Andrew 
Moravcsik’s Liberal Intergovernmentalism, are presented. The paper will thus 
take its departure from the rationalist understanding of European integration and 
question its central assumptions and implications. Chapter 3 presents the 
theoretical underpinnings of constructivism, and lays the foundation for possible 
developments of the framework more generally. Chapter 4 applies constructivism 
to the events of the SEA, and further develops the theory. Chapter 5 concludes.
31.2 Methodology
As stated above, the aim of this paper is two-fold. The mainly theoretical part, 
with the aim of developing the constructivist framework, therefore does not draw 
on any empirical material in the ordinary sense. Instead, the literature used to that 
part (mainly chapter 4) is needed to connect the ideas presented in this paper to 
those already advanced in the constructivist tradition. Since the development of 
the theory is partly made by polemizing against the rationalist tradition, the ideas 
in Moravcsik’s works will also serve as an important source. 
The other part of the paper is an application of the theory, intented to shed 
light on the events of the SEA. Here a number of different sources have been 
used, mostly as a way of establishing the ‘facts’ about the SEA and its actors. Due 
to the interpretive nature of constructivist analyses, however, the literature is also 
used as a way of delineating the important norms and values of the period.
1.3 Earlier Work on European Integration
The study of European integration has a vast historical record. It can, as a 
simplification, be divided into a number of bigger steps. Federalist, realist and 
intergovernmentalist approaches had their heydays in the middle of the 20th 
century. Later the neofunctionalist approach, famously represented by Ernst Haas, 
became influential.6 In recent years, however, Liberal Intergovernmentalism has 
become one of the most influential approaches in the field. Building on a 
rationalist ontology, it is by many seen as a perspective with a large expanatory 
potential. By denying the rationalist ontology, constructivism is a new alternative 
in the study of European integration. Formerly developed as a perspective in 
international relations studies, constructivist ideas have been applied to the field 
of European integration by e.g. Thomas Risse, Frank Schimmelfennig, Harald 
Müller, Arne Niemann, Ulf Sedelmeier and Jeffrey T. Checkel.7 The 
constructivist framework has more generally been developed primarily by 
Alexander Wendt, Friedrich Kratochwil and Nicholas Onuf.8 The events of the 
SEA have, however, not yet been analyzed from a constructivist perspective.
                                                                                                                                     
6 See e.g. Haas 1976. 
7 Among the most important works are Risse 2000, 2004; Schimmelfennig 2001, 2003a, 2003b; 
Checkel 2001, 2006; Niemann 2004.
8 See e.g. Wendt 1989, 1992, 1995; Koslowski and Kratochwil 1994; Kratochwil 1989, 2000; 
Onuf 1989. 
42 Liberal Intergovernmentalism
2.1 The Liberal Intergovernmentalist View of the 
Single European Act
It is uncertain whether rationalists and constructivists can agree on a common 
description of what the Single European Act (SEA) implied; usually, their views 
of political events differ fundamentally as to what really happened. However, if 
rationalism and constructivism in any tangible way are conflicting and not only 
complementing perspectives—which is the reasonable interpretation—there must 
be certain descriptions of events they have in common, but with different 
explanations to the causes and effects of these events. 
Almost any perspective claims that the SEA was an important event in the 
development of the EC, not least since it implied the end of the ‘Eurosclerosis.’ 
Concerning the details of the interpretations of the underlying causes and effects 
of the events, however, the two perspectives are likely to differ significantly. The 
Liberal Intergovernmentalist perspective, widely conceived to explain much 
concerning European integration,9 will here be regarded the point of departure. In 
order to motivate a constructivist view of the events, the general features of the LI 
description of the events surrounding the SEA will first be presented. Thereafter 
certain aspects of the LI analysis, that arguably are controversial or 
counterintuitive, will be highlighted. 
The LI framework of explaining European integration is divided into three 
steps. First comes the establishment of national preferences, second comes 
interstate bargaining, and third come the different institutional changes that follow 
from the bargaining in step two. The core argument Moravcsik gives is, in this 
way, that the major steps of European integration should be seen as the result of 
negotiations as attempts to solve conflicts between the states and then establishing 
appropriate institutions according to this. National preferences are by Moravcsik 
assumed to be stable during negotiations, but not necessarily ‘across negotiations, 
issues, or countries,’ and they are also considered exogenous to a specific 
international environment.’10 In explaining national preferences, Moravcsik 
argues that it is a matter of weighing the relative importance of geopolitical 
                                                                                                                                     
9 Schimmelfennig 2004, p. 75.
10 Moravcsik 1998, p. 24. 
5interests and economic interests.11 He therefore challenges the idea that the SEA 
was importantly dependent on the impact of supranational powers as a sufficient 
condition for reform. However, Moravcsik concedes that supranational 
entrepeneurs played ‘a unique role’ in the negotiations leading to the SEA, but he 
nonetheless claims that they were only ‘secondary and limited to the efficiency of 
agreements.’12
According to Moravcsik, the three states that were most influential in the 
development of the SEA were Britain, France and Germany. Hence, his approach 
is analyzing the preference formation of each of these states. 
Britain, first, is viewed as guided primarily by economic interests, even 
though geopolitical and ideological considerations did play a role. Importantly, 
there was a strong support from businessmen for liberalization. In this way, 
Britain’s preferences are interpreted by Moravcsik as the extension of its domestic 
regulatory (neoliberal) reform. Thatcher thus sought maximum liberalization 
without any centralization of power in Brussels.13
West Germany was, according to Moravcsik, less opposed to the European 
project. The main actors were here the West German Foreign Minister Hans-
Dietrich Genscher, and later Chancellor Helmut Kohl. West Germany is described 
to seek European integration and more efficient EC institutions, but these interests 
were nevertheless secondary to economic interests. The pro-European attitude of 
Germany was importantly emphasized by the fact that the Draft Treaty, proposed 
by the European Parliament (EP), was almost unanimously supported by the 
Bundestag. Concerning trade liberalization and regulatory harmonization, the 
West German government was cautiously supportive as long as it did not threaten 
the existing high German standards for social and environmental protection. 
Finally, according to Moravcsik, did Germany’s commitment to ideological issues 
not contradict its economic interests at any point, but was still at the same time 
described as ambivalent about the question of economic regulation.14 Indicative of 
West Germany’s position is also that a ‘strong elite consensus favoured 
integration.’15
France, finally, was, again according to Moravcsik’s view, characterized by a 
combination of caution of the SEA and enthusiasm about European reforms. The 
failed ‘Socialist experiment’ in France during the late 1970s and early 1980s is 
described as an important cause of the French President François Mitterand’s 
surprising enthusiasm about liberal reforms, which is also viewed as a major 
reason behind the French preferences more generally. Mitterand is, however, 
simultaneously described to emphasize the social justice aspect of European 
integration, and not only economic values. French business had nonetheless strong 
incentives to liberalize, and the EC was thought to be fruitful in that respect. 
                                                                                                                                     
11 Moravcsik 1998, p. 23.
12 Moravcsik 1998, p. 8; 1999, p. 270.
13 Moravcsik 1998, pp. 323-6.
14 Moravcsik 1998, pp. 326-32. 
15 Moravcsik 1998, p. 345. 
6Considering the French economic situation at the time, France was by many seen 
as forced to choose to ‘modernize’ or ‘decline.’16
Once the national preferences have been determined, Moravcsik’s analysis 
claims that the actual outcome is decided in the bargaining between the states. 
Once more Britain, West Germany and France are viewed as the most important 
actors, except in a few issues. According to Moravcsik, the outcome was very 
much the result of a convergence of national interests, and supranational and 
transnational entrepeneurs did not play any decisive roles in this process.17 The 
idea of a ‘two-speed Europe,’ suggesting that those who did not want further 
integration according to the demands of especially France and West Germany 
should be left out of much of the integration process, did also play an important 
role in the events. ‘Two-speed Europe’ was in fact used by France and West 
Germany to push Britain into further concessions regarding integration in 
general.18
The call for a new Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) was initiated by Kohl 
and Mitterand, but in fact made by Italy. This call for an IGC was for the first 
time made by majority vote, and this fact made Thatcher furious. In this period, 
Delors was at first nominated, and then selected as President of the Commission. 
By Moravcsik, an important move that can actually be attributed to Delors and the 
Commission’s influence is the linkage of an extended use of qualified majority 
vote (QMV) with the liberalization of the internal market.19
The IGC was not entirely the result of the bigger states’ demands, though. The 
need for a convergence policy was stressed by the smaller states, and not as an 
effect by the Commissions influence. Other outcomes of the IGC are also 
described along the same lines. Thatcher, Kohl and Mitterand are described as 
well-informed participants of the conference, whereas the outcome in most 
relevant respects was the second-best alternative to the monetary integration, 
democratization, industrial policy and foreign cooperation, which were the first-
hand choice of many EC officials. Only the efficiency and the speed of the 
negotiations can, again according to Moravcsik’s view, be attributed to 
supranational influence, and the SEA as a whole reflected the existent national 
priorities.20
The SEA, on this view, implied mainly three institutional reforms. First, it 
implied the extended use of qualified majority voting in the Council of Ministers. 
Second, the idea of a new approach based on ‘mutual recognition’ concerning 
liberalization of political regulation of economic issues was introduced. Third, the 
European Parliament was given greater powers under the cooperation procedure.21
                                                                                                                                     
16 Moravcsik 1998, pp. 332-40. 
17 Moravcsik 1998, p. 347.
18 See Moravcsik 1998, pp. 349ff. for how the negotiations were influenced by this idea.
19 Moravcsik 1998, pp. 360-3.
20 Moravcsik 1998, pp. 367-73.
21 Moravcsik 1998, p. 315.
72.2 Some Problems with the Liberal 
Intergovernmentalist Description of the SEA
Moravcsik’s interpretation of the events surrounding the SEA is extremely well-
structured. In line with the rationalist foundation that LI builds on, there are a 
number of important actors, exogenously given and clearly defined—in this 
context the member states, mainly represented by the governments—that are well-
informed and strategically acting, and whose intentional actions make up the bulk 
of the outcome. Let us, in order to more closely examine the argument Moravcsik 
makes, investigate how his analysis of the SEA relates to four categories that 
often are advanced as important to consider. These categories are: actorness, 
preferences, logic of action and norms.
Actorness is a concept that quite obviously is important to consider. On 
Moravcsik’s view, actors are defined exogenously to the political process. As 
such, the important actors are ‘assumed from the beginning’ rather than ‘found 
during the process.’ Moravcsik’s approach does not preclude other actors than 
states altogether, but is definitely centered around the supposition that states are 
the main actors. Since Moravcsik’s description is almost devoid of explanations in 
terms of agenda-setting and completely insensitive to discursive explanatory 
factors, there are reasons to question LI’s view of actorness.22
Preferences are also crucial to relate to. Moravcsik embraces the view that the 
preferences of the actors can change, but claims explicitly that they are stable 
during the negotiations. Since ‘stable preferences’ is an assumption Moravcsik 
makes rather than treating the issue as something subject to empirical 
examination, the importance and character of the actors’ preferences will be 
examined.
The logic of action that LI embraces is best explained as strategic and 
intentional. Adhering to the rationalist tradition, LI’s view of the SEA is that 
actions mainly are oriented towards the realization of specific goals, in their turn 
given by existent preferences. Based on the fact that actors often seem to act for 
other reasons than merely satisfying their preferences, LI’s rationalist 
understanding of the logic of social action in relation to the SEA will be 
challenged.
Norms, finally, are by many considered important to regard when analyzing 
political and social phenomena. Since norms best are viewed as institutionalized 
behaviour or practices, all reasonable theories of political science or political 
philosophy must take into consideration how norms and institutions constrain or 
                                                                                                                                     
22 One of the most famous problematizations of decision-making, and power more generally, is 
Steven Lukes’s (see Lukes 1974). Another famous account is that of Foucault, who emphasizes the 
ubiquity of power (see e.g. Foucault 1988). 
8facilitate action.23 In this respect, not only postmodern or constructivist views are 
obliged to do this; rationalist theories, too, consider the influence or norms on 
outcomes, albeit to a lesser degree. An interesting difference between 
constructivist and postmodern theories on the one hand, and rationalist on the 
other, is that the latter usually regards formal institutions as important, whereas 
the former recognize the importance of informal ones as well. LI does in this 
respect live up to its rationalist heritage. At no point does consideration of norms 
or informal institutions play a decisive role in Moravcsik’s analysis of the SEA. 
His view of the events, as shown above, is based entirely on the supposition that 
the different states were unhindered by informal factors; the negotiations were 
thus the result of the relevant actors’ negotiatory resources rather than anything 
else. Considering the issue of the influence of norms, widely conceived, there are 
reasons to question Moravcsik’s neglecting their relevance.
                                                                                                                                     
23 Margareth Archer makes this point in Archer 1990, p. 73, and claims that psychologism and 
holism are exempted from this reasonable consideration of the relation between agency and 
structure.
93 The Constructivist Approach
Rationalism has a very direct approach concerning the relation between agency 
and structure. According to the rationalist view, structure is secondary to agency, 
and can in theory be reduced to the behaviour of agents. Political events—no 
matter if concerning international relations, European integration or the study of 
organizations in general—are according to the rationalist understanding best 
described by investigating which the most important actors are and which power 
relations and preferences are relevant in the situation at issue. 
The rationalist emphasis on agency at the expense of structure is problematic. 
Structuralist theories, such as postmodernism, can in this context be seen as a 
reaction to rationalism’s possibly exceeding stress on the importance of agency 
compared to that of structure in its reverse understanding of that relation. The 
problematization of agency that characterizes different postmodern theories 
instead affirms the impact certain ideational components reasonably have, and in 
this way too much emphasizes the importance of structure at the expense of 
agency. Michel Foucault’s claim that actors and their actions are realizable first in 
the examination of structure is telling, but highly questionable.24
Rationalism and postmodernism in this way illustrates the extreme positions 
when considering the agency-structure problem. Many theorists have, along these 
lines, related the different theories to each other by placing them somewhere 
along a continuum reaching from describing everything completely in terms of 
agency to describing everything completely in terms of structure.25 However, both 
extreme positions are, according to most theorists, very hard to defend. A pure 
rationalism would posit the total freedom of the actors, since structure would not 
present any restrictions on their actions. Naturally, and necessarily, actors are to at 
least some degree influenced by the actions of others, and how they anticipate 
other actors will act in the future. The rationalist position must hence be 
supplemented with a reasonable explanation to how ideational factors are 
relevant. A pure rationalism is thus implausible. 
Extreme structuralism suffers from similar deficits in explanatory power. A 
theory that allows agency to be explained completely in terms of structure seems 
to lack many of the concepts ordinarily employed when describing political 
events. A structuralist explanation would in this way preclude any description of 
actorness; there would be no actions truly conducted by people or other actors. 
Everything would have to be explained as ‘actorless events.’ On such an extreme 
                                                                                                                                     
24 Giddens’s critique of this view is enlightening. See Giddens 1987, ch. 4. 
25 The idea of imagining the different theories as ontologically commensurable is debated. Thomas 
Risse, e.g., claims that there are no large differences between a sophisticated rational choice and a 
moderate constructivism. See Risse 2000, p. 3.
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view, the concept of change would also be contaminated in a way as to transform 
it to something utterly intangible. Very likely, an extreme structuralism would 
imply a sort of determinism that opposes our deepest intuitions. Yet, it does not 
seem structural or ideational factors can be completely left out.
Most reasonable explanations, however, describe political events in terms of 
both agency and structure.26 Anthony Giddens has along these lines emphasized 
the importance of treating these two concepts as different sides of the same coin in 
his theory of structuration.27 Following this idea, constructivism can be seen to 
occupy an ontological middle position between two extremes.28 Stressing that 
‘there are properties of structures and of agents that cannot be collapsed into each 
other,’29 constructivism differs fundamentally from the more established 
rationalist frameworks. 
Following the Giddensian approach, the constructivist interpretation of 
political events affirms the existence and influence of ideational factors, and 
emphasizes the dialectical and non-reductionist view of the relationship between 
ideas and matter. A reasonable operationalization is therefore that existing norms 
and institutions, regardless of whether they are formal or informal, must be taken 
into consideration. Set aside the putative rationalist claim that no norms should be 
regarded, a rather uncontroversial claim is that norms expressed and embraced by 
all or almost all of the main actors should be included in the description of the 
events. 
The study of norms and thereby the study of discourse is by many thought to 
be utterly difficult and almost inevitably more or less arbitrary. Considering, 
however, that even rationalist explanations necessarily imply the inclusion of 
ideational factors to at least some degree, this is a problem that is ineliminable. 
There is, however, an important divide between generally acknowledged 
ideational factors and unconscious ones. This difference is by Ole Waever 
understood as more or less sedimented structures.30 Sedimented structures, which 
thereby serve as established structural constraints, are unproblematic. However, 
less sedimented, too, reasonably have the potential of constraining action. 
Naturally, these factors reasonably can be placed along a continuum, but in this 
paper only the very rough distinction between generally acknowledged 
(sedimented) structures and unconscious (less sedimented) structures will be 
considered. 
                                                                                                                                     
26 Herbert Simon can be seen as an important proponent of a ‘watered-down version’ of 
rationalism, called bounded rationality. See e.g. Simon 1947.
27 Giddens 1984. See also Giddens 1982; Waever 2004. 
28 Adler 1989.
29 Risse 2004, p. 161.
30 Ole Waever 1998, p. 106-12.
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3.1 Three ‘Logics’ of Action
Rationalist theories rely on the assumption that actors’ behaviour is more or less 
rational. The general idea is that political actors have clearly defined preferences 
and act in a strategic way in order to maximize the fulfillment of these. According 
to this view, the goal of action is simply to ‘maximize or optimize one’s own 
interests and preferences.’31
The rationalist instrumental idea of political action, henceforth called the 
‘logic of consequentialism,’ has been questioned. In many aspects, actors simply 
do not seem to act rationally, but instead based on routine and tradition and 
without further contemplation on the consequences of their actions. This idea of 
explaining political action is often labelled the ‘logic of appropriateness,’ since 
the actors are thought to be rule-guided rather than goal-oriented.32 According to 
this perspective, political actors are mainly trying to do the ‘right thing,’ which 
means that they are continuously trying to identify the existing norms governing a 
certain situation. Since norms, rules and values are important concepts to consider 
when analyzing action in terms of the logic of appropriateness, the constitutive 
rather than merely the regulative aspects of these notions are emphasized.33
The distinction between the logic of consequentialism and appropriateness is 
sufficiently straightforward; the logic of consequentialism focuses on the 
conscious and strategic actions that seemingly characterize certain political 
behaviour, whereas the logic of appropriateness instead describes how political 
behaviour can be alternatively described as mainly unconscious and routinized. 
There is, however, another difference between the positions that ought to be 
considered. The logic of consequentialism builds on an individualistic ontology, 
whereas the logic of appropriateness is founded on a holistic one. Following 
Thomas Risse’s categorization, the logics of consequentialism and 
appropriateness need to be complemented with a third alternative. This third 
alternative, here called the ‘logic of arguing,’ combines the conscious and 
strategic behaviour of the logic of consequentialism with the holistic ontology that 
the logic of appropriateness builds on. The logic of arguing therefore differs from 
the logic of appropriateness in its focus on situations where there are no rules to 
follow and no clear norms that can govern behaviour. The actors hence are in a 
communicative process with the collective goal of constructing new norms. 
Jürgen Habermas’s theories about communicative action consider many 
different aspects in the communicative process the logic of arguing refers to. 
Drawing on speech act theory, all communication in the relevant sense implies 
certain validity claims. (Communication in the relevant sense must here be 
                                                                                                                                     
31 Risse 2000, p. 3. 
32 March and Olsen 1989; 1998.
33 On constitutive and regulative aspects of the agent-structure problem, see Dessler 1989 and 
Wendt 1987.
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defined as communication implying more than only ‘rhetorical action.’34) 
Following Habermas, there are three such claims. The first claim is its descriptive 
content; does it correspond well with the ‘objective’ world? The second has to do 
with its normative content; can the assertion be justified? The last validity claim is 
the question of whether it is stated in a sincere manner.35 These validity claims 
can and are continuously challenged during the process of deliberation. As Risse 
points out: ‘The goal of the discursive interaction is to achieve argumentative 
consensus with the other, not to push through one’s own view of the world or 
moral values. Since the validity claims of identities and interests are at stake in 
theoretical and practical discourses, an argumentative consensus has constitutive 
effects on actors.’36 Actors engaged in communicative action are therefore also 
prepared to be persuaded themselves. The core idea of communicative action is in 
this way to argue and reach a reasoned consensus. Unlike both the logic of 
consequentialism and the logic of appropriateness, the logic of arguing describes a 
process where nothing but the better argument is allowed to affect the outcome of 
the deliberative process.
The issue of how to distinguish the different logics of action from one another 
has been stressed by e.g. Jeffrey Checkel.37 Concerning the question of how to 
recognize social action based on the logic of arguing, I will mainly follow Risses 
operationalization. First, argumentative consistency is crucial. If the arguments 
presented change depending on who it is directed to, it is hardly a sign of 
argumentative rationality. Second, the arguments cannot refer to authority or rank, 
but only to whether the argument in itself is persuasive or not. Third, do the 
participants continuously justify their positions, or are they merely engaged in 
pure bargaining? The provision of justifying reasons for the provided arguments 
indicate argumentative rationality. Fourth, if the participants tend to use 
arguments by which they have been themselves convinced, it is also an indication 
of this.38 Situations characterized by contested norms and strong institutions are 
also claimed to motivate communicative action.39
3.2 The Concepts of Identity, Actorness and 
Role-Taking
Following Alexander Wendt’s idea of investigating the similarities between 
persons and states, the capability of having intentions seems a necessary condition 
                                                                                                                                     
34 Schimmelfennig 2003b: ch. 8.
35 See Eriksen 2000, ch. 3. See also Habermas 1981
36 Risse 2000, p. 10.
37 Checkel 1999; 2001. 
38 Risse 2000, pp. 18f.
39 Müller 2004, p. 401.
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for personhood.40 Reasonably, this aspect would be possible to generalize in order 
to apply it to any type of actor. What is of interest here is to delineate which 
features are interesting to take into account when discussing identity and actorness 
in political issues more generally. 
Importantly, are any ‘actors’ other than individual persons capable of having 
intentions? There are different ways of understanding intentionality. It could be 
understood in a reductionist fashion, according to which all intentions must be 
understood as merely the sum of its constituent parts. On such a view, states are 
incapable of having intentions; instead only its inhabitants are the sources of what 
is sometimes mistaken for a state’s intention. The reductionist account is generally 
considered doubtful, however, for many reasons. There are simply many 
occations where different individuals act together in order to achieve a certain 
goal. On a strict reductionist account, any joint efforts that would imply common 
goals are difficult, if not impossible, to describe. It simply seems a fact that 
groups of people can do things individuals alone cannot, and this makes complete 
reduction to individual intentions impossible.
If the reductionist approach is rejected, we are left with some sort of approach 
according to which the whole is more than the sum of its parts. According to such 
a view, the significance of the group at the expense of the individuals is 
highlighted. All such non-reductionist views of intentionality therefore posit the 
realities of non-individual actors’ intentions.41 In other words, any non-
reductionist view of intentionality arguably affirms the significance of identity 
and actorness that differs from the conventional materialist idea of what can 
constitute an actor. Hence, ideational factors seem to have significance, at least 
prima facie. Bearing in mind that the materialist-idealist debate has a long history, 
there seems there are no reasons a priori to reject the inclusion of ideas in 
political theory.
In order to provide an explanation to how changes in the pattern of identity 
occur, we need to supplement the above description. The conception of identity in 
terms of intentions is undoubtedly necessary, but not in itself sufficient, to 
understand what actorness is. I will here propose two other concepts that are 
important to consider when discussing identity, and thereby actorness, in 
European integration. These are role and function.
Starting with the concept role, it must be admitted that it often has a fuzzy and 
ambiguous meaning. Role has been used in a number of contexts, primarily in 
theatrical metaphors. In this context it should be seen as a societal position an 
actor can occupy which is generally supposed to imply certain practices. Role is in 
this way dependent on expectations from other actors. In the same way the 
characters of a theater play are expected to behave in a certain way, so are the 
different actors in political event expected to live up to their role. This mainly 
sociological conception of identity and actorness was famously developed by 
George Herbert Mead, who emphasized that the development of the self was 
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importantly dependent on the interaction with others. Mead’s illustrates this by 
referring to the idea that in order to become good at sports in general, one has to 
be able to take the perspective of the other.42 The development of identity 
therefore seems the result of different actors with the tendency to take certain 
perspectives. By taking the perspective of others, a person perceives what others 
expect of oneself. The idea of occupying a certain role is also entertained and 
further developed by Erving Goffman, who emphasizes how the interaction of 
people is continuously permeated by their conception of each other’s social 
roles.43
Then, are these descriptions of how individual persons develop their selves 
applicable to non-person actors? According to a description of a role in terms of 
practices or expectations, there seems to be nothing essential that separates 
persons from non-persons. It seems the important matter is that other actors 
normally expect a person or non-person to occupy a certain role; in other words, 
the norm that an actor behaves in the way conventionally associated with a certain 
role is what is crucial. This process also seems self-reinforcing; once the norm is 
to recognize a certain organization, state, group of individuals etc. as an actor, it 
will also in a sense become an actor.
Function is also worth considering. This concept can perhaps most 
successfully be considered a variant of role, but accentuating the question of the 
purpose of the role. Another way of putting it might be that role takes up the 
descriptive aspect of actorness (‘what is the content of a certain role?’) whereas 
function instead stresses its normative content (‘what justifies a certain role’s 
existence?’). Emile Durkheim is perhaps most well-known among those focusing 
on the function of the members of society, and how this is part of the definition of 
identity.44 In this context, analogous to the above passage, I will focus on function 
as a part of social identity more generally. In other words, it will not be applied 
only to individuals, but to all possible actors. Therefore, the function of an actor 
refers to in which ways the actor’s identity can be justified in terms of its purpose 
in and for society.
In sum, the concepts of identity and actorness are important in a number of 
ways. First, the intention of an actor is important insofar as it determines the 
potential the putative actor has of staying an actor. Its intention also has the 
potential of shaping other actors’ conceptions of it as an actor. Second, the role of 
an actor refers to how the actor is conceived by others, and thereby whether the 
norm is to consider it an actor and in which contexts. Third, the actor’s function is 
important, since even if the actor is normally considered a proper actor, it might 
under closer scrutiny not have the qualifications that reasonably should be needed. 
The process during which an actor is developed can in this way be seen as ‘role-
taking’ in the sense that there is a set of established and generally accepted roles 
that can be taken by different ‘potential actors.’
                                                                                                                                     
42 Mead 1934, pp. 152ff.
43 See Goffman 1959.
44 See Durkheim 1933.
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The three categories above presented are in a relevant way connected to the 
three validity claims presented by Habermas. Intention is easily related to the 
sincerity of the actor and its actions, and can continuously be questioned on that 
basis. Role is in the similar way linked to the validity claim of correspondance 
with reality, and function to the Habermasian normative claim. In this way, 
Habermas’s communicative action, originally applied to individual actors, is here 
applied to the concept of actorness.
16
4 A Constructivist Understanding of 
the Single European Act
The structure of this chapter, providing an interpretation of the SEA in 
constructivist terms, is as follows. First a general characterization of the events in 
constructivist terms will be presented. Thereafter follows a short analysis of which 
the important norms prevalent during the period were. An analysis of which the 
important actors were, and how these were affected by the events of the SEA, 
finally concludes. 
4.1 Characterizing the Events of the SEA
In 1974, the Paris summit had implied the formalization of the European Council, 
which was thought to provide the EC with the impetus that was needed for further 
development. The clearly intergovernmental direction the EC was pushed in 
because of this reform is obvious, due to the European Council’s configuration of 
only the heads of state and government of the member states, and it soon became 
a very important agenda-setting body.45 The EC’s new intergovernmental 
character was summarized by Margaret Thatcher’s words: ‘there is no such thing 
as a separate Community interest; the Community interest is compounded of the 
national interests of the Ten member states.’46
Arguably, there was a widespread conception that the EC was not functioning 
satisfactorily and that something had to be done about it; the birth of the European 
Council is an indication of this. It is also clear that the supranational institutions of 
the EC—the Commission, the European Parliament and the ECJ—were discontent 
about the situation. These supranational forces within the EC made continuous 
attempts to change it. The direct elections to the EP beginning in 1979 can be seen 
as having improved the legitimacy of the whole EC, and thereby the EP also 
gained influence in the organization as a whole. At the same time a host of 
initiatives were taken at many different levels in order to develop the EC. Jacques 
Delors’s declaration in 1986 that ‘all the family quarrels have been sorted out,’ 
and, ‘the family is now going to grow and we can think of the future,’47 also point 
to the fact that there had been some severe problems and that change was long 
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overdue. It was widely recognized that the EC had to develop economically. In 
order for this to happen, though, the EC reasonably had to develop politically and 
institutionally as well. The need for change resulted in a number of actions of 
different kinds. The Davignon Report and the establishment of the European 
Political Cooperation have been seen as a result of that need. The then Prime 
Minister of Belgium, Leo Tindemans, produced one of the first initiatives 
concerning this political and institutional development of the EC. Tindemans’s 
report, issued in 1976, proposed e.g. that a common foreign policy and defense 
system, economic and monetary union, European social and regional policies, and 
joint industrial policies should be part of the EC agenda. Moreover, he proposed 
that the EC was in need of a stronger executive body and elected legislature. 
Tindemans’s report was, however, in most respects discarded. Another important 
step towards SEA was the committee appointed by Giscard d’Estaing that 
consisted of ‘Three Wise Men.’ This committee came to the conclusion that the 
main problem was the cumbersome nature of the policy-making. The Three Wise 
Men, too, came to the conclusion that the Commission should be endowed with 
more authority, and that majority voting should be more widely used in the 
Council of Ministers. This committee was also unsuccessful in making any 
changes.48 Further, the so-called Genscher-Colombo plan, making much the same 
proposals as the others before that, had little practical impact on the development 
of the EC. Thereafter followed also the plan issued by Altiero Spinelli, resulting 
in a Draft Treaty on European Union in 1984 with the aim of increasing the power 
of both the EP and the Commission. That, too, came to have no concrete results. 
Finally, after the urgings of among others François Mitterand, the Dooge 
Committee was formed, and in 1984 and 1985, it worked out a proposal for the 
next integrative step for the EC.49 Both Mitterand and Helmut Kohl had stated that 
they very much were in favour of a European Union. Backed by these leaders, 
very much of what the Dooge Committee proposed survived. In the formal 
proposal put forward at the European Council, the International Governmental 
Conference (IGC) that would follow should consider improving the Council of 
Minister’s decision-making procedures, strengthening the Commission’s 
executive power, increasing the powers of the EP and extending common policies 
to new fields of activity.
4.1.1 The Logics of Action
Moravcsik’s analysis of the SEA is, as stressed above, predominantly describing 
action in terms of the logic of consequentialism; according to him, the major 
actors had their set of preferences from the beginning of the negotiations and 
these were kept during the whole process. A natural response to this is to question 
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(see e.g. Andersson and Lindahl 1994, p. 35). 
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this assumption, since a view of stable preferences during negotiations only 
affirms the regulatory aspects of the negotiations and precludes any constitutive 
ones. In other words, LI is analytically incapable of embracing the possibility that 
the negotiations themselves actually had an influence on the preferences or, in the 
wider perspective, on identity. 
Admittedly, LI does not totally rule out the possibility of changes in identity 
over time. Given Moravcsik’s claim that LI is especially suited to describe the 
‘bigger steps of European integration,’50 the theory can still harbour the possibility 
of changing identities inbetween the ‘bigger steps.’ It seems, however, that this 
feature is an important flaw; it seems a fact that the integrative process of Europe
has implied important changes in our view of Europe. Moravcsik’s claim to the 
effect that there exists no ‘European identity’ since the people of the EC/EU at no 
point has considered the European identity more important than their national 
identity is in this case simply unjustified, since it suggests that identities are 
mutually exclusive. Contrary to this, I believe that identity is best understood as 
potentially overlapping, which in turn means that a person is capable of having 
multiple identities. A relevant example is that one can be both e.g. Swedish and 
European. Even though LI in this way is compatible with the idea of shaping and 
reshaping of identities over time, it does not explicitly touch the issue. This is, in 
my mind, an important flaw of the LI framework.
4.1.2 Events Directly Related to the Negotiations
As pertains to the negotiations of the SEA, the different actors were described as 
well-informed and strategically acting.51 In other words, Moravcsik understands 
the situation according to the logic of consequentialism. Here an important feature 
of the discussions prior to the SEA is relevant: it was generally considered to 
imply highly technical issues. This meant that many parts of the SEA simply were 
beyond the scope of the governments of the member states to decide. The major 
implications of this are two: who the real actors were is unclear, and the nature of 
the negotiations plausibly were affected. Both of these implications are not easily 
reconcilable with the rationalist conception. 
First there is the question of which were the relevant actors in the situation. 
Since much of the material was discussed and brought forward by experts, the 
influence of the participants in the actual negotiation became less important. Here 
the technical expertise of groups such as the Commission and other supranational 
and transnational actors gained influence. This conclusion is supported by 
Sandholtz’s claim that the Commission’s influence is greatest in those areas were 
it possesses the greatest policy expertice, and where Member States face imperfect 
information or uncertainty, or are searching for new policy alternatives.52 The fact 
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that the EC experienced an economic recession and were urged to try new 
methods in order to solve the situation—which of course meant uncertainty about 
the outcome—also supports the fact that the Commission had a greater influence 
than before. Sandholtz further claims that ‘under such circumstances international 
organisations (like the Commission) can seize the initiative to supply new models 
and strategies and to promote bargains.53
Second, negotiations under conditions of uncertainty suggest that the 
participants of the negotiation were acting more according to the logic of arguing 
than consequentialism. It also fulfills the condition that the situation is 
characterized by contested norms and strong institutions.
4.1.3 Widening the Scope: Before the Negotiations
Quite clearly are the actual negotiations important, but they are hardly the only
things that are important; the events before the negotiations are arguably crucial to 
consider.54 Again, from a constructivist perspective not only the formal 
institutions and norms are relevantly considered, but also the informal ones. 
Starting with the formal powers of the Commission, its agenda-setting power was, 
in Mark Pollack’s words, ‘minimal or non-existent prior to the adoption of the 
SEA.’55 The influence of different supranational actors was nevertheless 
substantial. Many describe Jacques Delors and Lord Cockfield to have had a lot of 
influence before the negotiations. Pollack’s description that the two ‘enjoyed a 
clear success in setting the agenda for the 1992 SEM programme, and for SEA 
generally’ illustrates this point well.56
Moravcsik, however, challenges the above conclusion. He instead claims that 
the Commission essentially did not manage to get any of its main priorities 
approved, and that many of the things the Commission actually proposed already 
were prioritized by Britain, France or West Germany.57 Whether or not his 
assertion is correct is, reasonably, a matter of interpretation rather than fact. 
According to David Wincott, Moravcsik’s claim is not the whole story, though: 
‘the basic, innovative policy techniques required for the internal market 
programme had been fashioned in the daily work of the supranational institutions 
(essentially the Commission and the Court of Justice) long before the Member 
states considered these issues.’58
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by Lukes (see Lukes 1974). According to his argument, it is quite unclear how to define who has 
power. Reasonably, not only the actual decision is important.
55 Pollack 1997, p. 119. 
56 Pollack 1997, p. 126.
57 Moravcsik 1998, p. 373. 
58 Wincott 1995, p. 606.
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Regarding the period at issue, the Commission is repeatedly claimed to have 
influenced the outcome a great deal.59 The President of the Commission, Jacques 
Delors, is in this context seen to be a truly important force. His influence on the 
European Council is claimed to have resulted in the inclusion of references to the 
EMU—regarded one of the Commission’s prioritized issues—in an important 
summit in the fall of 1985.60
Reasonably, a conception of the events of the SEA cannot only focus on the 
negotiation process itself, but also take into account the different events that led to 
it. In this way, the events can easily be described as guided by the logic of arguing 
in the meetings between the different actors regarding many of their attempts to 
propose new policy guidelines. Much of the preparatory work carried out by e.g. 
the Commission can also be characterized as following a logic of appropriateness, 
where actors (sometimes individuals working in the Commission) without the 
authority to take important decisions themselves, merely did what was expected of 
them. 
The process is for the most part not characterized by reference to ‘authority or 
rank,’ as Risse puts it. Even though it in this context is problematic to apply the 
ideas of communicative action, there were many summits as well as informal 
meetings between the different actors, and therefore an interpretation in these 
terms can be applicable nevertheless. Further, the actors continuously justify their 
positions in the process, which also supports the conclusion that the logic of 
arguing is relevantly applied.
4.2 Norms
The next feature of the LI analysis of the SEA that will be analyzed is its 
treatment of norms. Moravcsik’s view does not in any substantial way include 
norms in the description and analysis of political events. Nevertheless, norms are 
relevant for both rationalist and constructivist analyses of politics in at least two 
ways. First, established norms may indicate how actors probably will act, which 
of course is a help for other actors on both a rationalist and constructivist view. 
Second, concerning behaviour that is not entirely instrumental, different norms 
typically influence behaviour; actors act according to what they usually do, or 
according to what they are supposed to do. In this way norms can reasonably be 
claimed to affect social action regardless of theory.
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4.2.1 The Norm of ‘New Measures’
The events preceeding the SEA can convincingly be described as lacking order. 
Starting with the Luxembourg compromise in 1966, which meant a further 
interstate emphasis regarding EC decision-making, the EC experienced a deep 
pessimism concerning its future.61 It is unquestionable that this period forced 
politicians and decision-makers to take action in order to address the situation. In 
this way, as Alan Cafruny observes, did the SEA appear a ‘politically acceptable 
path to further integration.62 The view of the SEA as the result of a whole range of 
failed economic programs, such as ‘the snake’ during the 1970s, is also suggested 
by David Cameron.63 This conception of the problem was not limited to certain 
groups, but a wider phenomenon. At state-level, Moravcsik himself has noted that 
there was a widespread need for renewal of the economies. The French awareness 
of the failure of the ‘Socialist experiment’ greatly supported the influence of 
liberal and neoliberal ideas.64 The turn in French economic policy can be 
described as radical.
In sum, I claim that one quite easily observable norm in the mid-1980s was 
that action had to be taken in order to stop the current economic—and political—
recession in Europe. Due to the many years of economic recession, and to the 
almost complete failure of political and economic cooperation and development 
during the 1970s and early 1980s, I argue that the norm was that something had to 
be done about the situation. Keeping in mind that a number of reports, suggestions 
and proposals by a whole host of different national, supernational and 
transnational actors in the EC had been rejected, the prevailing norm was 
moreover that the situation was critical enough to take completely new measures 
in order to solve it. 
4.2.2 The Norm of ‘New Roles in the EC’
Another important norm that was present during the time preceeding the SEA, and 
which actually is connected to that of a critical situation in need of new measures, 
is how the former actors of the EC seemed inadequate to control the process of
European integration. The Luxembourg compromise can, once more, be regarded 
an indication of this. The same goes for Giscard d’Estaing’s initiative to create the 
European Council as a means to coordinate European policies. The European 
Council, however, is by constitution a clearly intergovernmental organization with 
the aim to enhance the cooperation between the states involved, and thereby more 
of a direct and informal interaction between the states rather than an emergent 
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political entity. There were other EC bodies that had developed in another fashion, 
though. The Commission, first, was developing during the mid-1980s to 
something as yet unpreceeded in the history of the EC. Under the leadership of 
former French Finance Minister Jacques Delors, the Commission found a number 
of ways to extend its powers within its formal limits. At the same time, there was 
a growing awareness of the need of development of the EC. In other words, the 
EC needed a new actor with the role of being the motor and main intitiator of new 
policies for the Community. Furthermore, the role of being the motor and main 
initiator had to be claimed by an actor with the potential of being sufficiently 
influential and not having to regard any national ties. More and more, the 
Commission assumed that role. Aside from the informally strengthened position it 
had achieved, the treaty itself meant further increases of its formal powers.
4.3 Reconceptualizing Identity
As stressed earlier in this paper, a plausible theory of European integration should 
be able to handle the idea of the shaping and reshaping of identity. I have 
criticized the rationalist tradition, here represented by LI, for not being able to do 
exactly that, and have at the same time proposed an alternative way of analyzing 
European integration that is supposed to handle this problem satisfactorily.
Starting with the identities of the formerly established actors, Britain, France 
and West Germany are naturally uncontested as the main actors even on a 
constructivist understanding of the events. Even though constructivism does not 
presuppose their identities, the norm of conceiving these three states—and of 
course all the other member states, but to a lesser degree—as the main actors in 
European integration is probably one of the most sedimented of all political 
norms. This quite unproblematic interpretation leads to results that touch upon and 
in many ways coincide with those presented by rationalist theories. Analyzed in 
terms of our developed constructivist toolbox, the member states’ roles are in all 
relevant respects unquestioned; there are no discernable norms that openly and 
convincingly challenge the dominance of the member states in that regard. The 
function of the member states is also best interpreted as uncontroversial. 
Justifications of the member states’ function in the EC can be made in a number 
of ways. Most important, reasonably, is the way the member states already have a 
developed political and administrative system—ultimately connected with the 
peoples—that in relevant ways act under the authority of the different 
governments. In this way, the function of the member states in the EC can be 
linked to their domestic functions. As regards their intention, finally, member 
states represented by their governments are easily conceived of as having 
intentions. Consequently, the member states display all requisite signs of being 
political actors. 
The Commission is a different story. It is clear that it has an intention, 
conspicuously illustrated by the actions of especially Jacques Delors, but also of 
other commissioners. The fact that since its inception the Commission has been 
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described as a ‘leader’ and ‘informal agenda-setter’65 indicates that the 
Commission actually produces new ideas and tries to impose these on the EC as a 
whole. The Commission’s role is more problematic, though. In the 1970s and the 
early 1980s the Commission was, as claimed above, often regarded as lacking 
political clout. During that period the European Council had partly taken over the 
role as agenda-setter, which ought to be interpreted as making the role of the 
Commission, in turn, less clear. Moreover, there are definitely problems in 
viewing the Commission as a unitary actor.66 All of these factors naturally 
obscure the exact role of the Commission at the time prior to the negotiations of 
the SEA. 
Another way of describing the unclear role of the Commission is in 
Habermasian terms: the validity claim regarding the ‘objective’ state-of-affairs of 
the Commission was challenged. In that situation, the role of the Commission had 
to be justified—albeit mostly implicitly. I here argue that this justification is best 
understood by reference to the function of the Commission. In this respect, the 
Commission’s resources in terms of e.g. knowledge and expertise, impartiality 
and neutrality, and the ‘motor role’67 are important. General perceptions of the 
Commission between 1985 and 1992 were that ‘there was a widely held desire to 
confront policy problems and policy failures,’68 which further supports the idea 
that the Commission successfully determined its role in the EC by relating it to its 
function.
The EP had had a rather anonymous role in the EC, with little powers to wield. 
Before the SEA, the Council of Ministers had ‘relatively little difficulty in 
ignoring them.’69 The first elections to the EP, held in 1979, should perhaps be 
seen as enforcing the EP’s powers in the EC, even though these were primarily 
consultive.70 The view of the EP’s role was in many ways much more unclear 
than that of the Commission. The EP’s function is by comparison much easier to 
characterize; with the EP as an EC body directly elected by the people, the EC 
would mitigate the problem with the democratic deficit. The role of the EP could 
therefore be supported by referring to its justifying function for the whole of the 
EC. Regarding whether the EP is capable of having intentions, the issue turns into 
a very speculative one. A plausible conception of intention should, in my mind, be 
linked to the possibility the actor has in order to make quick decisions and use its 
informal powers to the maximum. Compared to the Commission’s ability to do 
this, the EP is nowhere close. Moreover, the EP is a much more diverse institution 
than both the Commission and the ECJ due to its composition of elected members.
The SEA implied a big change for the EP. The institutional changes 
introduced the cooperation procedure as a decision-making process, which among 
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other things meant that the EP had the right to reject certain legislation.71 The EP 
thus was provided with certain agenda-setting power as well. Naturally this 
change had implications for its identity and thereby actorness. Nevertheless, the 
EP remained a rather weak actor during the whole period at issue, all things 
considered. 
The same analysis naturally applies to the European Court of Justice (ECJ). 
The actorness of the ECJ does in important respects differ from both the 
Commission and the EP, due to its function as an arbiter. Arguably, this function 
of the ECJ is generally considered essential for the EC/EU, whereby no further 
justification seems necessary. Its role is in the same way unquestioned. Regarding 
its intention, the ECJ is often supposed to have no own agenda. This conclusion 
has, however, been seriously challenged, and the ECJ is now often seen as a 
‘policy-making body in its own right.’72
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5 Conclusions
The Single European Act (SEA) was in many ways a milestone that symbolized 
the break with the economic—but also political—recessionof the 1970s and early 
1980s. The EC did due to the SEA experience a period of economic and political 
integration that ultimately had the potential of changing Europe in fundamental 
ways. The events leading to the SEA and the implications of the treaty itself in 
this way implied changes in both the formal and informal institutions in the EC. 
Traditional analyses of European integration have most often relied on certain 
rationalist assumptions about the nature of politics. This paper has been an 
attempt to break with this traditional approach and instead analyze the events of 
the SEA in constructivist terms. In so doing, the need for refinement and 
development of the constructivist ‘toolbox’ resulted in a specification of the 
conditions under which identity is shaped or reshaped. This specification draws on 
three different concepts connected to actorness: intention, role, and function. By 
applying these concepts to conventionally recognized important actors in the 
EC—the Commission, the European Parliament, and the European Court of 
Justice—this paper provides an interpretation of the SEA that in a number of 
important respects differ from the prevailing rationalist analyses, here represented 
by Liberal Intergovernmentalism (LI). First, LI does not acknowledge the 
importance of norms to a sufficient degree. Different norms have here been 
included in a plausible description of the events leading to the signing of the SEA. 
Second, the rationalist approach of understanding political action in terms of 
strategic action or the ‘logic of consequentialism’ seems to be inadequate to 
describe the events. Third, and perhaps most importantly, the constructivist ability 
to understand identity—as endogenously rather than exogenously determined—
differs radically from the rationalist conception. By this approach, constructivism 
has a way of describing and understanding changes in identity over time in a 
highly intuitive way.
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